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PARTIES 
The names of all parties are contained in the caption of this Brief. 
Hereinafter, this Brief refers to the parties as follows: 
• "Homeowner" refers jointly to the Appellants who were the 
Defendants, Cross-Claimants and Third-Party Plaintiffs below. 
The masculine pronoun is used in reference to the Homeowner 
because, although Joan Hopkins was named in the complaint, 
this was only because her name appeared on the title of the 
home at issue. It was Lamar Hopkins ("Mr. Hopkins") who was 
involved in the dealings with Rodger Uhrhahn and who was 
present at trial. 
• "Uhrhahn Construction" refers jointly to Appellees Uhrhahn 
Construction and Design, Inc., the Plaintiff and Counterclaim 
Defendant below, and to appellee Rodger Uhrhahn, the Third-
Party Defendant below. When Rodger Uhrhahn is referenced in 
his individual capacity, he is referred to as "Mr. Uhrhahn." 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a(2)(j) (2004) gives the Utah Court of Appeals 
jurisdiction over this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Rules of Appellate Procedure permit an appellee to include a 
statement of issues if dissatisfied with the appellant's statement. Utah R. 
App. P. 24(b)(1)(2006). Uhrhahn Construction is dissatisfied with the issues 
and standards presented in the Homeowner's Brief as follows: 
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A. Homeowner's Statement of Issue One: 
1. Framing of the Issue 
The first issue on appeal is not appropriately framed in the 
Homeowner's Brief. The first issue reads: 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY 
INTERPRETED THE CONTRACT ASSOCIATED WITH 
THIS CASE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND WHETHER 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND 
C O N C L U S I O N S SUPPORT SUCH AN 
INTERPRETATION. 
(Homeowner's App. Brf., p. 1). 
Uhrhahn Construction is dissatisfied with this statement as framed 
for two reasons. First, the statement assumes the existence of a single 
contract ("the contract associated with this case"). The major dispute at 
trial was whether, as the Homeowner claimed, there was just one contract 
comprised a set of written bid proposals and a change order, or whether, as 
Uhrhahn Construction argued, both written and implied contracts 
governed. The Trial Court determined the latter. 
Second, although the Homeowner's statement of the first issue is 
framed as challenging both the legal and factual findings of the Trial Court, 
the issue actually challenges only the findings of fact. Notably, the 
Homeowner's arguments throughout his Brief go to allegedly erroneous 
factual findings. (Homeowner's Brf., passim). Moreover, the Judge's legal 
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conclusions regarding the contractual issues naturally follow her findings 
of fact on those issues. See Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold Storage and 
Warehouse Inc., 872 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah App. 1994) (finding that issues 
characterized as legal challenges, truly disputed court's findings of fact 
where court's legal determinations simply followed from factual findings). 
Thus, the statement is more appropriately framed as follows: 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT SUPPORTED ITS DETERMINATION THAT 
VARIOUS CONTRACTS GOVERNED THIS CASE, AS 
OPPOSED TO A SINGLE CONTRACT, AND/OR 
WHETHER THOSE FINDINGS SUPPORTED THE 
COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SUCH CONTRACTS. 
2. Standard of Review 
Uhrhahn Construction does not disagree with the Homeowner's 
statement that a court's interpretation of a contract is a matter of law 
reviewed for correctness. (Homeowner's Brf., p. 1). However, that is not the 
standard of review applicable here. Because the first issue truly challenges 
only the Trial Court's factual findings, the standard of review applicable is 
the clearly erroneous standard used to address a trial court's findings of 
fact. More specifically, the clearly erroneous standard appellate courts 
apply when scrutinizing findings of fact, "does not permit findings to be 
overturned unless the great weight of evidence contradicts the findings." 
In re Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d 969, 979 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). 
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The Homeowner also references Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure in the standard of review section of issue one. (Homeowner's 
App. Brf., p. 1). Although Rule 52(a) is not a standard of review, Uhrhahn 
Construction does not dispute that the rule is applicable in this appeal. 
B. Homeowner's Statement of Issue Two: 
Uhrhahn Construction disputes the standard of review the 
Homeowner argues is applicable to statement of issue two. The 
Homeowner's statement of the second issue reads: 
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT 
AWARDED APPELLEES COSTS AND ATTORNEY 
FEES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 38-1-11 
(UTAH MECHANIC'S LIEN STATUTE) WHEN IT 
FAILED TO ENTER SUFFICIENT FINDINGS AND 
CONCLUSIONS IN SUPPORT OF ITS AWARD. 
Uhrhahn Construction is not dissatisfied with the language used in 
framing issue number two. However, the Homeowner states that the 
applicable standard of review is that applied to a legal determination, when 
issue two is again truly a challenge to the Trial Court's factual findings. 
Therefore, for the same reasons outlined above, the clearly erroneous 
standard discussed in Knickerbocker applies to the second issue. Also, as 
stated above, although Uhrhahn Construction does not dispute the 
applicability of U.R.C.P. 52(a), that rule is not a standard of review. 
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C. Insufficiency of Issues in General: 
The issues presented in the Homeowner's Brief leave it unclear 
whether or not he is appealing from the entire judgment because the issues 
do not speak to the Homeowner's Counterclaim and Third-party claim for 
wrongful lien. The wrongful lien claim is statutory and the requisite 
elements of the statute do not involve the contractual issues the 
Homeowner raises, but instead go to the amount of the lien and the lienor's 
intent, matters not raised in the Homeowner's statement of the issues. 
Because the Homeowner's statement of issues and subsequent arguments 
fail to address the wrongful lien claim, the Trial Court's ruling on the 
wrongful lien Counterclaim and Third-party claim should be affirmed. See 
Snow Flower Homeowner's Ass'n v. Snow Flower, Ltd., 2001 UT App 207, | 
14, 31 P.3d 576 (citation omitted) ("This court has routinely declined to 
consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal."). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
The section of the Homeowner's Brief containing the controlling 
statutes and rules does not cite to all relevant provisions of the Mechanic's 
Lien Act. When looking at the Trial Court's rulings on the contractual 
issues, the following provisions of the Mechanics' Lien Act are controlling: 
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1. Utah Code Ann. 8 38-1-2 (2002)1. "CONTRACTORS" AND 
"SUBCONTRACTORS" DEFINED. 
Any person who does work or furnishes materials by 
contract, express or implied, with the owner, as 
provided in this chapter, shall be considered an 
original contractor, and all other persons doing work 
or furnishing materials shall be considered 
subcontractors . 
2. Utah Code Ann. 8 38-1-11 (2002). ENFORCEMENT - TIME FOR -
LIS PENDENS - ACTION FOR DEBT NOT AFFECTED - INSTRUCTIONS AND 
FORM AFFIDAVIT AND MOTION. 
(1) A lien claimant shall file an action to enforce the 
lien filed unde r this chapter within: 
. . . (b) 180 days from the date the lien claimant last 
performed labor and services or last furnished 
equipment or material for a residence, as defined in 
Section 38-11-102. . . . 
(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair or 
affect the right of any person to whom a debt may be 
due for any work done or materials furnished to 
maintain a personal action to recover the same. 
3. Utah Code Ann. 8 38-1-18 (2002), ATTORNEYS' FEES - OFFER 
OF JUDGMENT. 
(1) Except as provided in Section 38-11-107 and in 
subsection (2), in any action brought to enforce any 
1
 Plaintiff filed the lien at issue in 2002. Therefore, although the Mechanics' 
Lien Act was amended in 2004, the trial was based on the statute in effect in 
2002. 
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lien under this chapter the successful party shall be 
entitled to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be 
fixed by the court, which shall be taxed as costs in 
the action. 
The following rules are also applicable to this appeal: 
4. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, BRIEFS. 
. . . A party challenging a fact finding must first 
marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged finding. 
5. Rule 52. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (2006), FINDINGS BY 
THE COURT. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without 
a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find 
the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law thereon. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case came for trial on Uhrhahn Construction's claims of 
foreclosure on a mechanics' lien and collection of a debt incurred by the 
Homeowner, both based on written and implied contracts. The Homeowner 
filed a Counterclaim against Uhrhahn Construction and a Third-party 
Complaint against Mr. Uhrhahn personally, alleging breach of contract and 
wrongful lien. The Homeowner's breach of contract claim was based on the 
assertion that the bid proposals at issue, plus a written change order, 
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constituted a binding, sum-certain contract which Uhrhahn Construction 
breached. 
Uhrhahn Construction and the Homeowner tried their cases on 
separate days. On the first day of trial, December 8, 2004, Uhrhahn 
Construction presented its case. The Homeowner presented his case on the 
second day of trial, April 26, 2005. The Trial Court found that the evidence 
established Uhrhahn Construction provided labor, services and materials 
to the Homeowner for the construction of his home ("the home") under both 
written and implied contracts. The Court further found that the 
Homeowner failed and refused to pay substantial amounts owing under 
such agreements. Therefore, Uhrhahn Construction prevailed on the 
mechanics' lien claim. The Trial Court also found that the same evidence 
supported Uhrhahn Construction's alternate claim for collection of a debt 
and that the evidence failed to support the Homeowner's Counterclaim and 
Third-party claims. This appeal ensued. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because the Homeowner has failed to marshal the evidence, Uhrhahn 
Construction should not be forced to do so here. (The arguments 
supporting failure to marshal the evidence are briefed extensively below). 
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However, out of an abundance of caution, Uhrhahn Construction marshals 
the facts the Trial Court Judge found in support of her rulings:2 
A. Contractual Issues 
The following findings of fact are applicable to the contractual issues 
raised in this appeal. Thus, these facts go to the Trial Court 's decisions on: 
• Uhrhahn Construction's cause of action for a debt owed; 
• The portion of Uhrhahn Construction's mechanics ' lien claim 
based on contractual issues; and, 
• The Homeowner's Counterclaim and third-party claim for 
breach of contract: 
1. Uhrhahn Construction provided labor, material and services to 
the Homeowner, a substant ia l amount of which were based on written bid 
proposals ("the proposals"). (R. 140). 
2. The proposals Uhrhahn Construction submitted were estimates 
of how much it would cost for partial construction of the home. (Add. to 
Homeowner's Brf., p . 10; R. 135). 
2
 The facts contained in this section are taken from the "Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law," the Trial Court's "Memorandum Decision," and Uhrhahn 
Construction's "Closing Argument Brief." The propriety of incorporating 
documents other than the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" is detailed 
in the argument section of this Brief. 
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3. After Uhrhahn Construction began working on the home, Mr. 
Hopkins made frequent requests tha t increased the scope of Uhrhahn 
Construction's responsibilities. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p. 10). 
4. The Homeowner's additional requests resulted in Uhrhahn 
Construction taking on and completing a substant ial amount of work 
outside the original proposals. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p. 10). 
5. The Homeowner should have known Uhrhahn Construction 
expected to get paid for such work. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p. 11). 
6. Uhrhahn Construction sent multiple itemized invoices to the 
Homeowner outlining the additional work. (R. 141). 
7. The Homeowner paid for additional work detailed in the invoices, 
including: 
• extra footings 
• hand excavation 
• extra power and water pump costs 
• increased concrete costs 
• extra water and sewer services 
• several other miscellaneous extras 
(R. 141-42). 
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8. By agreement between the Homeowner and Mr. Uhrhahn, 
Uhrhahn Construction did not complete certain portions of the framing, 
electrical and plumbing originally contained in the proposals, and the 
Homeowner was not billed for those portions. (R. 140). 
9. The Homeowner quit paying Uhrhahn construction for additional 
work after disputes arose, particularly over Durisol block. (R. 141). 
10. During the bidding process, Mr. Hopkins requested installation 
of Durisol blocks ra ther than s tandard cinder blocks. (Add. to Homeowner's 
App. Brf., p. 15; R. 209). 
11. Mr. Uhrhahn informed Mr. Hopkins tha t he had never installed 
Durisol block before, only s tandard cinder block. (R. 135). 
12. Mr. Hopkins misrepresented to Mr. Uhrhahn tha t the Durisol 
block would take only V2 the time to install as cinder block. (Add. to 
Homeowner's Brf., p. 15; R. 209). 
13. Mr. Uhrhahn had no reason to believe Mr. Hopkins did not know 
what he was talking about or tha t Mr. Hopkins was misleading him. (R. 
145). 
14. Based on Mr. Hopkins' representations, Mr. Uhrhahn went 
ahead and bid the job for Durisol block because tha t would mean Uhrhahn 
Construction would also get the bid for rough framing. (R. 145). 
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15. Uhrhahn Construction did not supply the Durisol Block; the 
Homeowner purchased it himself. (R. 141). 
16. The Durisol block was seriously deformed, causing added 
difficulty with installation. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., pp. 10 and 15; R. 
209). 
17. Uhrhahn Construction was required to dedicate much more time 
to installing the Durisol blocks on the home because they were deformed, 
making the installation m u c h more difficult. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p. 
10). 
18. Despite the additional work and difficulties Uhrhahn 
Construction encountered, Uhrhahn Construction continued to perform its 
work diligently and professionally. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p. 11). 
B. Damages 
All items of damages listed below are found in the Cost Review 
Analysis Mr. Uhrhahn prepared at the request of Mr. Hopkins and his 
architect. (R. 164-187). In addition, these damages are also detailed in 
Uhrhahn Construction's Closing Argument Brief, including a statement of 
evidence presented for each. (R. 146-150). Specifically, the Trial Court 
found the following facts in support of the principal damage award, based 
on the combination of written and implied contracts: 
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19. The original bid proposals totaled $74,023.00. (R. 146). 
20. Invoices for the total work Uhrhahn Construction completed on 
the home came to $100,645.22. (R. 146). 
21 . In addition, the Court found that the Homeowner owed Uhrhahn 
Construction additional amounts as follows: 
a. Based on Mr. Hopkins' misrepresentat ions to Mr. 
Uhrhahn, as well as the Cost Review Analysis, Uhrhahn Construction 
was owed an additional $8161.99. (R. 147). 
b . Based on the Cost Review Analysis, the Homeowner owed 
Uhrhahn Construction an additional $1,457.09 for footing work. (R. 
147). 
c. Due to the problems with the Durisol block, the 
Homeowner owed Uhrhahn Construction an additional $900.00 for 
steel angles over windows and rough framing of the sub-floor. (R. 
147). 
d. The Cost Review Analysis evidenced an additional 
$1712.50 owed for back fill, construction of a retaining wall and 
earthwork. (R. 148). 
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e. Uhrhahn Construction paid $2603.43 to satisfy a lien filed 
by Butterfield Lumber for materials Mr. Hopkins charged to Uhrhahn 
Construction's account without Mr. Uhrhahn ' s permission. (R. 149). 
f. The gross amount owing was reduced based on the 
following credits: 
• $157.50 credit discovered during the Cost Review 
Analysis for foundation and footing items; 
• $6.03 credit for concrete supplies; 
• $668.00 credit for electrical work; 
$1457.09 credit for footing work; 
• $2,920.00 credit for additional cost for a framer, 
Matt Collett, to complete framing to fit the Durisol 
block; and, 
• $47,882.22, the amount the Homeowner paid 
Uhrhahn Construction. 
(R. 148-49). 
22. Based on the facts identified in paragraphs 19 through 21 
above, the Trial Court found the principal amount of damages totaled 
$62,386.29. (R. 150). 
23 . Damage summar ies presented by the Homeowner failed to 
establish that he suffered any damages. (R. 150). 
-14-
24. The Homeowner presented no witnesses, other than himself, to 
establish his alleged damages. (R. 150). 
25 . The Homeowner failed to produce any cancelled checks to prove 
his alleged damages. (R. 150). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE VALIDITY OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS ON ALL CONTRACTUAL ISSUES, AS 
WELL AS THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BECAUSE THE 
HOMEOWNER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE ON 
THOSE ISSUES 
A. The Trial Court 's Findings of Fact Are Sufficient Regarding the 
Contractual Issues on Appeal 
B. The Trial Court Entered Sufficient Findings Regarding the 
Principal Amount of Damages Owing to Uhrhahn 
Construction 
C. The Trial Court 's Findings That the Homeowner Failed to 
Provide Support for His Alleged Damages Should Be Presumed 
Valid 
D. The Homeowner Should Not Be Permitted to Marshal the 
Evidence in His Reply Brief 
II. BASED ON THE VALID FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH THE TRIAL 
COURT RELIED, THE COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSIONS REGARDING 
UHRHAHN CONSTRUCTION'S RIGHT TO RECOVER UNDER 
CONTRACTUAL THEORIES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
A. Uhrhahn Construction Completed Work under Express 
Contracts 
B. Uhrhahn Construction Completed Work Pursuan t to Implied 
Agreements 
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III. REMAND IS APPROPRIATE REGARDING THE JURISDICTIONAL 
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE ACT 
IV. PLAINTIFF PROPERLY FILED AN ALTERNATE CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR COLLECTION OF A DEBT 
V. THE HOMEOWNER PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF HIS 
COUNTERCLAIM AND/OR THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT FOR BREACH 
OF CONTRACT 
VI. THE COURT'S RULING DENYING THE HOMEOWNER'S WRONGFUL 
LIEN CLAIM SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE COURT SHOULD ASSUME THE VALIDITY OF THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS ON ALL CONTRACTUAL ISSUES, AS 
WELL AS THE PRINCIPAL AMOUNT OF DAMAGES BECAUSE THE 
HOMEOWNER HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE ON 
THOSE ISSUES 
The Homeowner h a s failed to marshal the evidence regarding the 
contractual theories underlying the Complaint, Counterclaim and Third-
Party Claims. The Homeowner has also failed to meet his marshaling 
burden regarding the principal amount of damages. Thus , the Court should 
assume the sufficiency of the findings of fact on those issues . 
The Homeowner correctly notes tha t the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provide tha t a court "shall find the facts specially and state separately its 
conclusions of law therefrom. (Homeowner's Brf., p . 15, citing U.R.C.P. 
52(a)). However, before an appellant can appropriately challenge factual 
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findings he mus t first marsha l the evidence in support of those findings. 
On this point, the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure require that 
. . . [a] party challenging a fact finding m u s t first 
marshal all record evidence that suppor ts the 
challenged finding. 
U.R.A.P. 24(a)(9). The duty to marshal is a heavy burden, requiring the 
appellant to first marsha l all evidence supporting the court 's findings, and 
then show why the findings are flawed. Oneida/SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1052-53. 
In Oneida, this Court discussed the marshal ing requirement at length, 
stating: 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial cour ts ' 
factual findings lightly. We repeatedly have set forth 
the heavy burden appellants m u s t bear when 
challenging factual findings. To successfully appeal 
a trial court 's findings of fact, appellate counsel 
mus t play the devil's advocate. '[Attorneys] mus t 
extricate [themselves] from the client's shoes and 
fully a s sume the adversary's position. In order to 
properly discharge the [marshaling] duty . . ., the 
challenger mus t present, in comprehensive and 
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very finding 
the appellant r e s i s t s / 
Id. (Citations omitted) (brackets, elipses and emphasis in original). Once an 
appellant has established every last fact support ing the adversary's 
position, he mus t then "ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and 
demonstrate why the facts the trial court found fail to support its ruling. 
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Id. at 1053 (citation omitted). In other words, the appellant, after 
exhaustively detailing every fact upon which the court relied, must then 
show that those findings are "so lacking in support as to be 'against the 
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous." Id. 
(citations omitted). When the appellant has not properly discharged the 
duty to marshal the evidence, "[appellate courts] refuse to consider the 
merits of challenges to the findings and accept the findings as valid." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
The only rare exception to the marshaling requirement is if the 
appellant can show that the trial court's findings as framed are legally 
insufficient, i.e., the findings do not provide enough detail to demonstrate 
the evidentiary basis for the decision thereby allowing for meaningful 
review. Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah App. 1995) (citation 
omitted). However, even then, findings of fact are sufficient if they in most 
respects conform to the pleadings, even though the facts may be very 
general. Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977). See also 
Matter of Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 1248 (Utah App. 1989). 
A. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact Are Valid Regarding the 
Contractual Issues on Appeal 
Despite the Homeowner's contention, the Trial Court entered more 
than sufficient findings of fact regarding the contractual issues. In addition 
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to the "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law/' the Court drafted a 
"Memorandum Decision" outlining facts and incorporating Uhrhahn 
Construction's Closing Argument Brief ("Uhrhahn's Closing Brief), 
containing even more factual statements. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf., pp. 
9-13). The Homeowner's Brief does not contain the facts found from 
Uhrhahn's Closing Brief, rather, the Homeowner inappropriately provides 
only 7 selected facts related to the contractual issues on appeal. 
(Homeowner's Brf., pp. 4-5, If 1-7). See Oneida/'SLIC, 872 P.2d at 1053 
(appellant's presentation of only selected facts in support of its arguments 
failed to satisfy marshaling requirement). 
The Homeowner was required to marshal the evidence contained in 
Uhrhahn's Closing Brief. First, the Trial Court specifically incorporated 
Uhrhahn Construction's brief in its Memorandum Decision, which states: 
[T]he Court notes that the factual overview and legal 
arguments presented in [Uhrhahn Construction's] 
Closing Argument Brief are generally consistent with 
this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
(Add. to Homeowner's Brf., p. 10). 
Second, Utah Supreme Court precedent is on point. In Knickerbocker 
the appellant challenged the trial court's findings of fact as being erroneous 
since it included no specific findings as to an insurance company's 
requirements for changing beneficiaries. Knickerbocker, 912 P.2d at 979. 
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The Utah Supreme Court rejected this argument, finding tha t because the 
record contained a copy of the insurance policy stating those requirements, 
the trial court was not obligated to restate them in its findings of fact in 
order to reach its ul t imate conclusion. Id. Specifically, the court observed: 
The record includes a copy of the . . . policy stating 
the requirements for changing beneficiaries. The 
trial court was not obligated to restate them in its 
findings in order to conclude that [the policyholder] 
had substantially complied with them. The trial 
court is not required to recite each indicia of 
reasoning tha t leads to its conclusions, nor is it 
required to marsha l the evidence in support of 
them. 
Id. 
The Trial Court in this case went even further than did the trial court 
in Knickerbocker. Not only was a copy of Uhrhahn ' s Closing Brief in the 
record, the Trial Court Judge specifically stated in her Memorandum 
Decision that her findings were consistent with Uhrhahn ' s Closing Brief. 
Thus, there were more t han sufficient findings of fact on the contractual 
issues that the Homeowner was required to marshal ; because he failed to 
do so, the Court should a s sume the validity of those findings. 
B. The Trial Court Entered Sufficient Findings Regarding the 
Principal Amount of Damages Owing to Uhrhahn Con-
struction 
The Trial Court found that Uhrhahn Construction provided clear and 
credible evidence establishing the amount of his damages. To the contrary, 
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the Homeowner provided nothing in support of its damage claims. Again, 
the Homeowner ha s failed to marshal the evidence upon which the Trial 
Court relied in determining the principal amount of damages awarded to 
Uhrhahn Construction. 
The damages calculation is detailed in Uhrhahn 's Closing Brief, 
including citations to the evidence upon which the Trial Court relied. (R. 
146-150). That calculation is reproduced here for the Court 's convenience: 
The original bid Proposals add up to $74,023.00. In addition, 
Uhrhahn Construction is entitled to recover for additional work 
completed. 
1. Invoices 
$100,645.22 The invoices in the Cost Review Analysis 
r e p r e s e n t t h e w o r k U h r h a h n 
Construction completed and for which 
the Homeowner was billed. 
2. Ext ras /Change Order 
8,161.99 The original invoice for Durisol Block was 
billed at $27,905.00, which was 
approximately $8,500.00 above the 
original bid, but was based on Mr. 
Hopkins' misrepresentat ions. The Cost 
Review Analysis evidenced it cost even 
more to install the Durisol Block. Once 
Mr. Uhrhahn did the figures, instead of 
the invoice being $27,905.00, it should 
have been $36,066.99, leaving a 
difference from t h a t invoice of 
$8,161.99. 
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1,457.09 The footings and Change Order came to 
$10,115.30. After Mr. Uhrhahn 's review 
of the time sheets and material receipts 
in preparation to complete the requested 
Cost Review Analys is , U h r h a h n 
Construction truly had a cost of 
$11,572.09, which resul ts in an 
additional $1,457.09 for all footing work 
completed. 
900.00 This amount relates to the steel angles 
over windows necessi tated by the Durisol 
Block which included an installation 
charge. Uhrhahn Construction originally 
bid the windows to have rebar as shown 
in the Durisol manua l . However, this 
was not workable, requiring the extra 
work. This number also deals with the 
rough framing of the sub-floor. After a 
review of Uhrhahn Construction's time 
sheets, there were four additional hours 
plus superintendent hours . The time 
sheet cost resulted in an additional 
charge of $900.00 on the rough framing 
of the sub-floor. 
1,712.50 This i tem re la tes to back-fill and the 
construction of a retaining wall, as well 
as other miscellaneous earthwork. The 
Invoices for this work totaled $4,350.00. 
However, based upon Mr. Uhrhahn 's 
review of the time sheets and equipment 
rates, the total should have been 
$6,062.50, leaving a difference of 
$1,712.50. 
$ 12,231.58 Total for Ext ras /Change Order 
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3. Credits 
157.50 Foundation and footing items were billed 
at $8,294.93. After Mr. Uhrhahn's 
review of the time sheets and materials 
receipt, Uhrhahn Construction had a 
cost of $8,137.43, giving the Homeowner 
a credit of $157.50. 
6.03 The original bid proposal for concrete 
slabs was $12,670.00. In addition, there 
was a concrete price increase of 
$ 1 7 2 . 5 3 . However, U h r h a h n 
Construction had to use fewer yards 
than originally bid for, reducing the 
amount actually owing on this item 
below the original bid proposal, even 
after the price increase, thus giving the 
Homeowner a credit of $6.03. 
4. 
$ 163.53 
Summary 
$100,645.22 
12,231.58 
$112,876.80 
163.53 
Total for 
Invoices 
Extras 
Credits 
$112,713.27 Total amount of construction based 
upon Mr. Hopkins' misrepresentations, 
as well as written and verbal 
agreements, and evidenced in the Cost 
Review Analysis. 
$ 2,603.43 Lien filed against Uhrhahn Construction 
by Butterfield Lumber for supplies Mr. 
Hopkins purchased and charged to 
-23-
Uhrhahn Construction's account without 
permission. Uhrhahn Construction paid 
to release the lien. 
$115,316.70 Subtotal of construction plus satisfied 
lien. 
- $ 47,882.22 A m o u n t t h e H o m e o w n e r pa id to 
Uhrhahn Construction. 
$ 67,434.38 Total amount of damages 
In addition, Mr. Uhrhahn agreed at trial to reduce the damage claim 
as follows: 
$ 668.00 Credit for electrical work 
$ 1457.09 Credit for footing work 
Total: $ 65,306.29 ($67,434.38 m i n u s $ 668 , m i n u s 
$1457.09). 
The Trial Court permitted an offset to the total damage figure in the 
amount of $2,920.00 based on the testimony of framer Matt Collett who 
testified this was an additional cost to the Homeowner to get the framing to 
match the block work. Accordingly, after subtracting the offset, the Court 
found that Uhrhahn Construction established principal damages in the 
amount of $ 6 2 . 3 8 6 , 2 9 , Because the Homeowner failed to marsha l the 
evidence on the principal amoun t of damages, the facts upon which the 
Trial Court relied should be presumed valid. 
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C. The Trial Court's Findings That the Homeowner Failed to 
Provide Support For His Alleged Damages Should Be 
Presumed Valid 
Even if the Homeowner would have succeeded on his contractual 
arguments, he failed to establish damages at trial. The Homeowner 
presented not a shred of evidence to show he suffered damages as a result 
of any alleged breach of contract. In fact, the only evidence the Homeowner 
presented other than his bare assertions that he incurred damages, was a 
set of conflicting damage summaries he prepared for trial, which the Court 
found were not credible. Moreover, the Homeowner did not produce a 
single witness or a single cancelled check to prove damages, other than the 
offset for Matt Collett's work as discussed above. 
D. The Homeowner Should Not Be Permitted to Marshal the 
Evidence in His Reply Brief 
The Homeowner should not be permitted to remedy his error by going 
through the marshaling process in his reply brief. The Utah Supreme Court 
has condemned such attempts, declining to consider an appellant's 
evidentiary challenges where it failed to marshal the evidence until the reply 
brief. Atlas Steel, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n, 2002 UT 112, H 40, 61 P.3d 
1053 (eleventh-hour attempt to marshal evidence in reply brief is too late). 
The court further observed: 
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An appellant seeking to challenge the sufficiency of 
the evidence to support a finding fact mus t 
under take and meet the heavy marshal ing bu rden 
in its opening memorandum of law on appeal. An 
appellant c anno t . . . wait to marshal the evidence in 
its reply brief. 
Id. at If 4 1 . Therefore, an at tempt on the par t of the Homeowner to marshal 
the evidence in his reply brief should be rejected. 
II. BASED ON THE VALID FINDINGS OF FACT UPON WHICH THE 
TRIAL COURT RELIED, THE COURT'S LEGAL CONCLUSION 
REGARDING UHRHAHN CONSTRUCTION'S RIGHT TO RECOVER 
UNDER CONTRACTUAL THEORIES SHOULD BE AFFIRMED3 
Uhrhahn Construction marshaled the evidence in the fact section out 
of an abundance of caution. Those facts support the Trial Court 's legal 
conclusion tha t Uhrhahn Construction established the existence of both 
express and implied contracts under the Mechanics ' Lien Act ("the Act"). 
Despite the Homeowner's argument, jus t because there were written bid 
proposals, does not m e a n those could not be modified a n d / o r supplemented 
by implied agreements . See Pacific Development, L.C. v. Orton, 1999 UT App 
217, Tf 11, 982 p.2d 94 (rejecting argument tha t only written agreements 
can modify written contract, where s tandard principals of contract 
3
 The Trial Court's "Memorandum Decision" references Uhrhahn's Closing 
Brief in support of her legal conclusions. The legal analysis is taken from that 
briefing. (Add. to Homeowner's Brf, pp. 9-13; R. 137-146). 
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construction permit parties to modify written contract based on conduct or 
oral agreement). 
Moreover, the Act specifically provides for recovery based on both 
express and implied contracts. Specifically, § 38-1-2 of the Act defines 
"subcontractors" and "original contractors" based upon the contracts under 
which they provide services: 
Any person who does work or furnishes materials by 
contract, express or implied, with the owner, as 
provided in this chapter, shall be considered an 
original contractor, and all other persons doing work 
or furnishing materials shall be considered 
subcontractors. 
U.C.A. § 38-1-2 (emphasis added). 
This Court's analysis in the case of Gary Porter Construction v. Fox 
Construction, Inc., 2004 UT App 354, 101 P.3d 371 is directly on point. In 
that case, the defendant general contractor entered into a subcontract with 
the plaintiff to perform various excavation and soil placement services for 
a specific sum. Id. at Tf 3. After work on the project began, the contractor 
requested the subcontractor to perform additional work not included in the 
subcontract or the original bid. Id. 
At times the contractor verbally acknowledged that the subcontractor 
was providing services outside the contract, and up until a certain time, the 
contractor paid for all work done by the subcontractor, whether or not it 
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was included in the written contract. Id. at If 4. However, the contractor 
quit paying after numerous disputes arose between the parties. Id. 
Therefore, the subcontractor filed suit against the contractor alleging 
various contractual theories based on an implied contract, despite the 
existence of a written contract. Id. at ^ 6. 
The trial court granted the subcontractor summary judgment and this 
Court affirmed, holding tha t an implied contract existed. Id. at *§ 7 & f 22. 
In affirming the trial court 's ruling that the contractor owed the 
subcontractor additional compensation for work performed outside the 
written contract, this Court noted that the subcontractor had successfully 
satisfied the elements necessary to establish an implied in fact contract, 
including: 
(1) [the contractor] requested [the subcontractor] 
to perform the work under the Excluded Sections, 
(2) [the subcontractor] expected additional 
compensation from [the contractor] for the work, 
and (3) [the contractor] knew or should have known 
tha t [the subcontractor] expected additional 
compensation. 
Id. at^ f 17. In satisfaction of the elements, the subcontractor presented 
evidence showing tha t at times the contractor acknowledged the 
subcontractor was providing extras, and for several months the contractor 
reviewed and paid itemized bills from the subcontractor for work provided 
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outside of the contract. Id. at Tf 18. Based on such evidence, this Court 
held that an implied contract existed and the contractor knew or should 
have known that the subcontractor expected to be paid for work he did 
outside of the written contract. Id. at f 21. 
A. Uhrhahn Construction Completed Work under Express 
Contracts 
Uhrhahn Construction completed substantial work under the written 
proposals. The work Uhrhahn Construction completed pursuant to the 
proposals was clearly established at trial through Mr. Uhrhahn's testimony 
and the documents contained in the Cost Review Analysis. (R. 164-187). 
The portions of the framing, electrical and plumbing Uhrhahn Construction 
did not complete, which were in the proposals, was based on agreement and 
Uhrhahn Construction did not bill the Homeowner for the unfinished 
portions. 
B. Uhrhahn Construction Completed Work Pursuant to Implied 
Agreements 
As in Gary Porter Construction, the Trial Court found that Uhrhahn 
Construction performed services for the Homeowner outside of the written 
bid proposals. Mr. Uhrhahn sent Mr. Hopkins multiple itemized invoices 
outlining the additional work, and the Homeowner paid for that additional 
work. The extra work Uhrhahn Construction completed outside of the bid 
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proposals for which the Homeowner paid include: extra footings, hand 
excavation, extra power and water pump costs, increased concrete costs, 
extra water and sewer services and several other miscellaneous extras. In 
addition, the Homeowner owed Uhrhahn Construction additional sums for 
the installation of the Durisol block because of Mr. Hopkins' 
misrepresentations. Mr. Uhrhahn, Rich Dorney and Robert Hille all 
testified that the block was deformed, a fact Mr. Hopkins failed to disclose 
to Mr. Uhrhahn before he bid the job. 
After paying for work Uhrhahn Construction completed outside of the 
written proposals, Mr. Hopkins quit paying for the work after disputes arose 
over the Durisol block. Therefore, based on the evidence Plaintiff presented 
at trial regarding the course of dealings between Mr. Uhrhahn and Mr. 
Hopkins, which practically mirrors the course of dealings between the 
contractor and subcontractor in Gary Porter Construction, the Trial Court 
found that Uhrhahn Construction satisfied the requisite elements to 
establish an implied in fact contract and to further establish that Mr. 
Hopkins knew or should have known that Mr. Uhrhahn expected payment 
for extras he provided outside of the bid proposals. 
The only evidence Mr. Hopkins presented in rebuttal was his own 
unsupported testimony. Despite his acceptance of additional services and 
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payment therefore, the Homeowner argued at trial, with absolutely no 
support, tha t there were no modifications to the bid proposals and that he 
is not obligated to pay for any of the extras Uhrhahn Construction 
completed that were not included in those proposals. Therefore, the Trial 
Court's legal conclusions regarding the contractual elements of the 
mechanics ' lien claim should be affirmed. 
III. REMAND IS APPROPRIATE REGARDING THE JURISDICTIONAL 
REQUIREMENT UNDER THE ACT 
Uhrhahn Construction concedes that the findings of fact are 
insufficient regarding the jurisdictional requirements of § 38-1-11 (requiring 
claim for foreclosure of lien to be filed 180 days from last labor or services 
performed or last material provided) .4 The undersigned counsel believed the 
facts supportive of jurisdiction were contained in Uhrhahn ' s Closing Brief. 
However, upon a close reading of that brief, as well as the Court's 
"Memorandum Decision" and "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," 
counsel agrees tha t the facts regarding jurisdiction are not included so as 
to allow meaningful review of the findings. Therefore, Uhrhahn 
Construction concedes tha t the Trial Court's findings on tha t issue are 
4
 On the second day of trial, the Homeowner moved to dismiss Uhrhahn 
Construction's claim for foreclosure on the mechanics' lien, arguing it was not 
timely filed. Uhrhahn Construction opposed based on a statute of limitations 
argument, but concedes after subsequent reading of case law that the time limit 
in this case is jurisdictional. 
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clearly erroneous and therefore, remand for further proceedings is 
appropriate as to this issue only. See Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 
(Utah 1983) (failure to make findings on all material issues requires 
remand). Whether the Trial Court erred in awarding attorneys fees and 
costs to Uhrhahn Construction under U.C.A. § 38-1-18 likewise cannot be 
determined prior to remand since tha t claim succeeds only if jurisdiction is 
proper. 
Because Judge Leslie Lewis is no longer on the bench, Uhrhahn 
Construction respectfully suggests that remand specifically for an 
evidentiary hearing before a new judge would be appropriate requiring the 
parties to point to all evidence presented at trial tha t may go to the 
jurisdictional issue. This would further judicial efficiency because 
otherwise, a new judge would have the onerous task of pouring through the 
entire trial transcript , as well as all trial exhibits. 
IV. PLAINTIFF PROPERLY FILED AN ALTERNATE CAUSE OF ACTION 
FOR COLLECTION OF A DEBT 
Even if Uhrhahn Construction had not complied with the Act, it 
would still be entitled to recover for the debt the Homeowner owes. In fact, 
the Act itself specifically states tha t such recovery is not precluded, 
providing: 
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(3) This section may not be interpreted to impair 
or affect the right of any person to whom a debt may 
be due for any work done or materials furnished to 
maintain a personal action to recover the same. 
U.C.A. § 38-1-11(3). Pursuant to subsection (3), Uhrhahn Construction was 
entitled to, and did, file a separate action for a debt the Homeowner owes 
for services and material. See also Motivated Mgmt Int'l v. Finney, 604 P.2d 
467, 468 (Utah 1979); Harris-Dudley Plumbing Co. v. Professional United 
World Travel Assoc, Inc., 592 P.2d 586, 588 (Utah 1979). Based on the 
same evidence presented in support of Uhrhahn Construction's claims 
under the Act, the Trial Court found that Uhrhahn Construction is entitled 
to recover the debt the Homeowner owes. 
V. THE HOMEOWNER PRESENTED NO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF 
HIS COUNTERCLAIM AND/OR THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT FOR 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Even if the written bid proposals constituted the only contract at 
issue, to the extent Uhrhahn Construction deviated from the contract, such 
deviation was justified based on Mr. Hopkins'misrepresentations, therefore 
rendering the contract voidable. Well established contract law provides that 
a contract is voidable if 1) there is a misrepresentation; 2) the 
misrepresentation is either fraudulent or material; 3) the misrepresentation 
induced the recipients to make the contract; and, 4) the recipient was 
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justified in relying on the misrepresentation. Miller v. Celebration Mining 
Co., 2001 UT 64, Tf 10, 29 P.3d 1231 (citation omitted). 
The Trial Court found that Uhrhahn Construction satisfied each 
element necessary to show the contract (to the extent there was even a sum 
certain contract in the first place) was voidable and that Mr. Uhrhahn was 
therefore justified in refusing to continue working under the written terms 
of the proposals. First, Mr. Hopkins made misrepresentations, specifically 
with regard to the Durisol block, stating to Mr. Uhrhahn that it would take 
only Vz the time to install as cinder block. Not only did the block fail to go 
swiftly as Mr. Hopkins represented, the block Mr. Hopkins purchased was 
seriously deformed, causing additional difficulties with installation. The 
evidence identified above clearly defeats the Homeowner's arguments on 
this point. 
Second, the misrepresentations were "material" because they directly 
impacted the amount Uhrhahn Construction bid for the job. Third, Mr. 
Hopkins' misrepresentations induced Mr. Uhrhahn to enter into the 
contract, not only because he would get the job for the block work, but 
doing the block work also meant he would get the job for the rough framing. 
Finally, the Trial Court properly concluded that Uhrhahn Construction 
satisfied the last element to establish the contract was voidable because Mr. 
-34-
Uhrhahn was justified in relying on the misrepresentations. Mr. Uhrhahn 
had never installed Durisol block, but had extensive experience in cinder 
block masonry; he informed Mr. Hopkins of this. Mr. Hopkins told Mr. 
Uhrhahn Durisol was an improvement over cinder block and even easier to 
install. Mr. Hopkins also provided some written material on Durisol block. 
Thus, Mr. Uhrhahn had no reason to believe Mr. Hopkins did not know 
what he was talking about or was otherwise misleading Mr. Uhrhahn. Mr. 
Uhrhahn was therefore justified in relying on Mr. Hopkins' representations. 
Because Uhrhahn Construction satisfies the requisite elements, even if the 
proposals constituted a contract, that contract was appropriately voided. 
VI. THE COURT'S RULING DENYING THE HOMEOWNER'S WRONGFUL 
LIEN CLAIM SHOULD BE AFFIRMED 
As discussed in the controlling statutes section above, although the 
Homeowner's Notice of Appeal states it is an appeal from the entire 
judgment, the Homeowner's Brief does not address his Counterclaim and 
Third-party wrongful lien claim. Because the Homeowner's statement of 
issues and subsequent arguments fail to address that claim, the Trial 
Court's ruling on the wrongful lien Counterclaim and Third-party claim 
should be affirmed. See Snow Flower, 2001 UT App 207, f 14, 31 P.3d 576 
(citation omitted) ("This court has routinely declined to consider arguments 
which are not adequately briefed on appeal."). 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court should be affirmed on every 
ruling with the exception of the jurisdictional issue, which is appropriate for 
remand. The Trial Court entered ample findings of fact regarding the 
contractual issues underlying Uhrhahn Construction's claims, and the 
Homeowner's Counterclaim for breach of contract. The Trial Court also 
found extensive factual evidence supporting the principal amount of 
damages. The Homeowner was required to marshal that evidence, but 
failed to do so. Therefore, the findings of fact as to the contractual issues 
and principal amount of damages should be presumed valid. The Trial 
Court's legal rulings following from those facts were also proper. Finally, 
the Trial Court's rejection of the Homeowner's wrongful lien claim should 
stand. 
Therefore, Uhrhahn Construction respectfully requests this Court to 
affirm the trial Court on all rulings with the exception of the jurisdictional 
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rulings and attorneys fee award following therefrom. A remand for an 
evidentiary hearing for those rulings would be appropriate. 
DATED this day of February, 2007. 
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